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Abstract
While the literature on traded goods prices emphasizes final goods prices and related
consumer theory to explain variation in goods prices with importer characteristics, trade in
intermediates actually constitutes about two-thirds of total trade. We propose a mechanism
for explaining variations in the prices of intermediates as a function of importer characteris-
tics, wherein production is vulnerable to failure and the probability of failure declines in the
quality of intermediates. Higher wages mean a greater opportunity cost of failure, leading
to a stronger demand for high-quality intermediates where firms face higher wages. We find
empirical support for this mechanism in the case of intermediate goods using IV regressions.
In addition, our findings indicate that while the cost of labor explains about one-fifth of
variation in imported intermediate prices, it is a non-significant determinant of imported
final good prices.
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1 Introduction
Explaining the pattern of traded goods prices has been the subject of a rapidly expanding
literature in international trade with studies using both firm level prices (Manova and Zhang,
2012; Verhoogen, 2008; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012; Crozet, et al., 2012; Martin, 2012; Görg,
et al., 2010; Bastos and Silva, 2010; Hallak and Sivadasan, 2010; Feenstra and Romalis , 2014;
Dingel, 2017; Flach , 2016; Gervais, 2015) and aggregate prices measured by unit values at
various product-aggregation levels (Schott, 2004; Hummels and Skiba, 2004; Hummels and
Lugovskyy, 2009; Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011; Harrigan, et al., 2015; Bekkers, et al., 2012).
To explain the pattern of traded goods based on importer characteristics, the theoretical
literature has focused on final goods and consumer theory (Hummels and Lugovskyy (2009),
Simonovska (2016), Alessandria and Kaboski (2011), Bekkers, et al. (2012)).1
The emphasis on final goods means factors linked to demand for intermediate goods
have been largely neglected.2 Yet, the majority of trade actually consists of trade in inter-
mediates. Hummels et al. (2001) is one of the first papers highlighting the importance of
intermediates trade. In this paper we aim to fill this gap, and offer an explanation for why
more developed countries might import more expensive intermediate inputs. In doing so,
we develop a model linking the pattern of traded goods prices of intermediates to importer
characteristics, and apply the model to a panel dataset on traded intermediates goods prices
and importer production costs. We show that sector-specific characteristics play an impor-
tant role in explaining the pattern of prices for traded intermediates. In particular, we show
that country-sector combinations with higher wages buy higher priced intermediates.
In principle, there are likely to be multiple mechanisms accounting for the correlation
between imported intermediate goods prices and importer characteristics. In this paper
we identify one such mechanism for which we also find empirical support. In the model
developed here, firms produce goods using both intermediates and primary factors. The
production process involves risk (it is vulnerable to occasional failure) and the probability
of failure is declining in the quality of intermediates. Failures in the production process
mean wasted resources (the inputs going into production). As these inputs include labor
services, higher wages mean higher opportunity costs for failure and therefore lead to a
stronger demand for high quality intermediates. This means, all other things being equal,
that higher quality (and so higher priced) intermediates should be in greater demand in
higher wage countries.
Our theoretical framework is related to three classes of models found in the literature.
The first one is Kremer’s (1993) O-ring model of production, where like the model here the
quality of each of the inputs enters multiplicatively in the production function. When one
of the inputs fails, the entire unit is rendered worthless, implying complementarity in the
quality of inputs. A key difference is that Kremer (1993) assumes an unspecified distribution
of the qualities of the labor inputs with assortative matching of the labor inputs as a result
of complementarity, implying that higher quality labor inputs receive a higher wage. Our
model instead contains an explicit relation between the quality of intermediates and the
cost of the quality of those intermediates. This relation is motivated by the fact that higher
quality goods are more expensive to produce or alternatively that higher quality goods
require more factor inputs.
Like Kremer (1993), Verhoogen (2008) also works with a wage schedule in which wages
rise (linearly) with the quality of labor inputs. However, he does not motivate this exclusively
from the O-ring theory of Kremer (1993) but also with reference to efficiency wage and fair
1Hummels and Lugovskyy (2009) show in a Salop circle model that by adding an increased willingness to
achieve the ideal variety when consumers are richer, firms can charge a higher markup in higher income markets.
Simonovska (2016) uses a model of firm heterogeneity with non-homothetic Stone Geary preferences, where firms
can charge a larger markup in higher income markets with consumers buying more of each good. Bekkers, et
al. (2012) compare the two mentioned theories by addressing the impact of within country inequality in the
importer country on traded goods prices, adding also a theory on the increased demand for quality in higher
income markets. Their empirical results lend support to explanations emphasizing non-homothetic preferences.
Francois and Kaplan (1996) provide early evidence linking inequality and non-homothetic preferences to import
demand patterns, though they focus on the composition rather than the pricing of imports.
2Based on a recent classification of detailed trade data by use category (Bekkers, et al., 2012), about two-thirds
of world trade is in intermediate goods.
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wage theories. A wage schedule type approach assumes that there is some distribution of
the qualities of workers (or intermediates), whereas in our approach it is costly (in terms of
a larger amount of labor resources required) to produce higher quality goods. As a variation
to our principal approach, we have also included a specification with a wage schedule for the
quality of intermediates. With a wage schedule approach, labor is heterogeneous and higher
quality intermediates are produced by more skilled workers, who receive a higher wage. This
also gives rise to a positive relation between the quality of intermediates and the price of
intermediates. In contrast with Verhoogen (2008), we assume that the wage schedule is non-
linear, implying a non-linear relation between the quality and price of intermediates and the
wage relative to productivity in the importing country. This heterogenous labor approach
contrasts with our basic specification, where higher quality intermediates are instead costlier
to produce because they require a larger amount of (homogeneous) labor resources.
A second model with a related mechanism on the probability of failure is proposed in
Keller and Yeaple (2013) with respect to a gravity specification of multinational produc-
tion. Affiliates producing intermediate inputs themselves, instead of sourcing them from
headquarters, have to complete a sequence of tasks and communicate with the headquarters
about each task to produce successfully. If one of the tasks fails, production is wasted. The
model is employed to show that the forces of economic gravity are stronger for affiliates in
technologically complex industries, where all other things being equal, more intermediates
are sourced from headquarters.
A third set of related models are the ones by Kugler and Verhoogen (2012). The first
model in Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) features complementarity between firm-level produc-
tivity and quality of inputs. Complementarity between productivity and quality of inputs
provides an explanation for the empirical finding that larger firms display both higher output
prices and higher input prices for intermediates. The model of Kugler and Verhoogen (2012)
could also be employed to explain our empirical findings by extending it with productivity
differences between countries.3 With complementarity between productivity and the quality
of inputs, more productive countries with higher wages would demand higher quality inter-
mediates. Conceptually, our model adds an additional feature to the quality-productivity
complementarity story of Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) with its emphasis on failure in the
production process: more productive countries display higher wages and therefore a higher
opportunity cost of failure generating a demand for higher-quality inputs. In Kugler and
Verhoogen (2012) instead the complementarity between quality and productivity emerges
by assumption.
Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) propose a second model to explain the firm-level stylized
facts based on Sutton (1991) and Sutton (1998), with complementarity between the quality
of inputs and fixed costs with fixed costs rising in the quality of output. As a result, more
productive firms spend more on fixed costs, use higher-quality intermediates with higher
input prices, and sell higher-quality output with higher output prices. This framework could
also be used to explain our stylized facts: higher income countries demand higher quality
goods, leading to more expenditures on fixed costs and by the complementarity between fixed
costs and quality to higher priced, higher quality intermediates. We can differentiate between
such a model and our model by evaluating whether wages in the importing country still
matter once controlling for GDP per capita. In the Sutton-model of Kugler and Verhoogen
(2012) higher priced intermediates are caused by a stronger demand for quality by consumers
(proxied by GDP per capita) and wages at the sector level should not matter anymore. Our
empirical results instead show that wages at the sector level stay significant once controlling
for GDP per capita, providing support for the framework developed here. To summarize,
our model contains an explicit relation between the quality and costs of intermediates in
comparison to the framework employed in Kremer (1993) and adds an additional feature
to the quality-complementarity mechanism of Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) (the role of the
opportunity cost of failure).
In our empirical analysis, we test the theoretical hypothesis that the price of labor in
the importing country leads to higher imported intermediate goods prices, controlling for
3Our modeling framework could also be extended with heterogeneous firms to explain the empirical findings
of Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) based on the increased opportunity cost theory in more productive higher wage
paying firms. Since we work with industry level data and are not interested in this paper in differences between
firm-level prices we do not pursue this extension here.
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labor productivity at sectoral level, market size and the level of development of the country.
To measure import prices we use import unit value data (import prices) from the BACI
database 4 which is constructed from COMTRADE and contains bilateral imports at the
6-digit HS level of classification (the greatest level of detail common across countries). Using
the WIOD dataset, an extension of the original EU-KLEMS dataset (Dietzenbacher, et al.,
2013; Koopman, Wang, Wei, 2014) we are able to identify imported intermediate goods. To
measure labor costs and productivity, we employ the EU-KLEMS database that includes
data on labor compensation and productivity at sectoral level. The WIOD database also
contains world input-output tables. This enables us to map the imported inputs from
partner countries into the importer sectors in the destination countries. As such we are able
to map the labor costs in a given importing sector to the product-level price of imported
inputs. This also means that in comparison to most of the literature we have substantially
more degrees of freedom for employing sector specific explanatory variables. (Most of the
literature on traded goods prices instead works with country-specific variables like GDP and
GDP per capita.)
In order to establish causality, we work with instrumental variable regressions. To instru-
ment the price of labor we use an instrument constructed by interacting the real exchange
rate with the hours worked by high-skilled persons engaged (share in total hours) per sector.
Using our product-level bilateral panel dataset, we find that higher labor costs relative to
productivity in the importing country leads to higher imported prices of intermediate goods.
In other words, countries where production is more expensive import higher quality, more
expensive intermediate goods for further processing. This holds even when controlling for
the level of development, the market size of the importing country, and the level of mar-
ket power of input providers. Moreover, we find that while sector-country-specific wages
explain about one-fifth of the variation in highly disaggregated intermediate goods prices,
wages are only marginally important in explaining final goods prices, providing further evi-
dence consistent with the O-ring theory. In addition, this indicates that not controlling for
destination-sector specific wage effects is likely to generate a significant omitted variables
bias.
In the next section we outline our theoretical model. In Section 3 we develop our esti-
mating equation. In Section 4 we discuss data, while in Section 5 we discuss our results.
Finally, in Section 6 we conclude.
2 Theory
2.1 Quality of Intermediates and Failure of Production
Consider a firm producing a final good X using both intermediate inputs Z and labor
inputs V . The firm uses I different intermediate inputs Zi with quality φi. The production
process is vulnerable to failure. Every intermediate input has to be of sufficient quality. The
production process is interrupted when there is a failure related to one of the intermediates
used, and the corresponding unit is lost. So, if one of the intermediate inputs is of bad
quality, the firm faces wasted inputs related to failed units of output.5
We define the probability that intermediate input i is of bad quality as pi. The expected
output E (X) of the firm is equal to the probability that none of the intermediate inputs i
is of bad quality times the output generated by the intermediate inputs Z and factor inputs
V , f (Z, V ):
E (X) =
[
I∏
i=1
(1− pi)
]
f (Z, V ) (1)
4http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/baci/baciwp.pdf
5Our concept of quality is different from the usual interpretation of quality in consumer theory where it can
be interpreted as product appeal or more generally a shifter in demand for given price. In our model quality is
defined by its effect on production failure: a higher quality intermediate generates a lower probability of failure in
production. So our definition of quality is similar to the definition of quality in Kremer (1993) where "a worker’s
skill (or quality) at a task, q, is defined by the expected percentage of maximum value the product retains if the
worker performs the task (p. 553)."
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The probability of intermediate input i being of sufficient quality to prevent failure,
qi = 1 − pi, is a function of the quality of the intermediate input, φi. We specify the
following function:
qi (φi) = φξi ; ξ > 0 (2)
The expected output is therefore equal to the following expression:
E (X) =
[
I∏
i=1
φξi
]
f (Z, V ) (3)
We see that expected output is a function of intermediate inputs and labor inputs and of
the quality of the intermediate inputs. Equation (3) could also be motivated directly from
the fact that higher quality intermediates lead to higher output, but our exposition provides
an intuitive motivation for the production function used in the next subsection based on
failure in production.
The production function in equation (3) is similar to the production function in Kremer
(1993). In our model there is a set of intermediate inputs combined with labor, while in
Kremer (1993) there is only a set of labor inputs. Each of the factor inputs can fail, making
the entire product worthless. This setup implies a complementarity between the level of
quality of the inputs like in Kremer (1993).
2.2 Baseline Model with N Countries
We study an economy with N countries and J industries. Final goods in industry j in
target country t are produced according to a CES production function with output Xtj a
function of a bundle of intermediates Ztj consisting of Itj intermediates and labor inputs
Vtj . Production is subject to failure as specified in the previous subsection, implying the
following production function:
Xtj =
 Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
(αztjZ η−1ηtj + αvtj (ϕtjVtj) η−1η ) ηη−1 (4)
Ztj =
 Itj∑
i=1
z
σ−1
σ
stij
 σσ−1 (5)
ϕtj is a measure of labor productivity in industry j in country t. ξ measures the importance
of quality for productivity, η is the substitution elasticity between intermediate inputs and
labor inputs and σ is the substitution elasticity between different intermediate inputs. We
assume that η < 1, reflecting that both intermediates and labor inputs are essential in
the production process. The composite intermediate input bundle Ztj consists of different
intermediates zstij bought from different source countries s and source sectors i. 6 αZtj
and αVtj are taste shifters indicating the importance of respectively intermediate inputs and
labor in the production function.7 Quality φstij is also i− specific, but does not vary with
the different units of variety i produced. So, quality is a property of a variety i and not of
the different units of variety i.
Factor markets are perfectly competitive and ωtj is the wage in country t in sector j.
The market for intermediate goods is perfectly competitive and firms use labor inputs in
production. The cost function of producing an intermediate product i in country s for
industry j in country t is given by:
C (zstij , φstij) = φγsistijzstij
ωsi
ϕsi
(6)
6The source country s should in principle contain an additional subscript tij on its subscript as the source
country is a function of the type of intermediates i bought and the target country t and industry j that buys
them. We omit this sub-subscript to prevent burdensome notation.
7Since intermediate input shares vary across sectors and countries we include these parameters. We do not
use variation in the shifters in the empirical part though, since they cannot be empirically observed, as shares
are also driven by prices.
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The parameter γsi is country specific and is an inverse measure of the productivity to produce
quality. Like above ωsi and ϕsi are respectively the price and productivity of labor in country
s in intermediate goods sector i the marginal cost of producing an intermediate rises in
the quality of the intermediate, reflecting that higher quality goods are more expensive to
produce or alternatively that higher quality goods require more labor inputs.8
There are iceberg trade costs τstij for shipping intermediate i from country s to final good
sector j in country t. Given perfect competition, price is equal to marginal cost. Therefore,
the landed price in the target country, pZstij , is given by:
pZstij = φ
γsi
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
(7)
Final goods producers minimize costs
Itj∑
i=1
pzstijzstij + ωtjVtj subject to the production
function in equation (4), choosing the optimal quantities of zstij and Vtj and the optimal
level of quality φstij . In A.1 it is shown that cost minimization implies the following quality
level and landed price for intermediate i produced in country s and used in sector j in
country t:
φγsistij =
ϕsi
τstijωsi
1
I
1
1−σ
tj
γ˜stij(
γsiγ˜stij
σ−1
ξItj
− 1
) 1
1−η
(
αvtj
αZtj
) η
1−η
(
ωtj
ϕtj
)
(8)
pZstij =
1
I
1
1−σ
tj
γ˜stij(
γsiγ˜stij
σ−1
ξItj
− 1
) 1
1−η
(
αvtj
αZtj
) η
1−η
(
ωtj
ϕtj
)
(9)
γ˜stij is a measure for the average productivity to produce quality for country t and industry j
of intermediate i in country s relative to other intermediates k from other countries u, γ˜stij =(
1
Itj
Itj∑
k=1
(
γsi
γuk
)) 11−σ
. Equations (8) and (9) imply that the quality of intermediates imported
and also the price of intermediates imported rise proportionally in the wage ωtj relative to
labor productivity ϕtj in importing country t. The intuition is that the opportunity cost of
failure rises when wages relative to productivity are higher. With either a higher wage or
a lower productivity, value added is more expensive and the opportunity cost of failure is
higher, giving a stronger incentive to source high-quality intermediates.9
2.3 Extension with Per Unit Trade Costs
The literature on traded goods prices has identified distance as an important determinant.
Hummels and Skiba (2004) show that a larger distance between trading partners raises
traded goods prices driven by the Alchian Allen "shipping the good apples out" effect. This
effect appears due to per unit trade costs. In A.2 it is shown that our model also displays
8On the cost side our model deviates from Kremer (1993), with the costs of intermediate inputs being an
explicit function of the quality of intermediate inputs. In Kremer (1993) there is an unspecified distribution of
qualities of the labor inputs and because of assortative mating of workers following from the complementarity
in the production function, firms pay a higher wage for higher quality workers. We work instead with an
explicit relation between the cost and thus the price of intermediate inputs and the quality of the inputs without
assuming a distribution of qualities of the inputs. The cost of the produced intermediates rises in the quality
of the intermediates, since more inputs are required to produce higher quality goods. In A.3 we incorporate a
(non-linear) wage schedule for labor used in the production of intermediates as in Verhoogen (2008). This leads
to a similar expression for the equilibrium quality and price of intermediates as with the cost function in (6).
9The multiplicative functional form of the cost function in equation (7) in combination with endogenous
quality implies that marginal costs τstijωsi
ϕsi
do not affect the price in equilibrium. With a more general cost
function, marginal costs in the exporting country would affect traded goods prices, but preclude us from finding
an analytic solution. Since we focus in this paper on importer characteristics, we stick to our tractable cost
formulation.
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the Alchian Allen effect after adding per unit trade costs to the model. The effect of wages
keeps the same sign with an elasticity deviating from 1 after the extension with per unit
trade costs.10
3 Estimating Equations
We start from the expression for the price of intermediates product i from country s sold in
sector j in country t in the baseline model in equation (9), omitting time subscripts. The
price of intermediate products, or unit values, is defined as the value of exports divided by
the volume of exports, pzstij =
pzstij zstij
zstij
. Ideally, we would have data for exporting product
- importing sector pairs. However, we only have data on unit values for an exporting product
i sold to all importing sectors j from country s to country t. In order to link the exporting
product to the importing sector and to explain unit values with our theoretical expression
for prices in equation (9), we use weights for adding up destination sectors j. The weights
used are the volume shares of sector j in total sales of sector i in source country s sold to
target country t, wstij = ZstijJ∑
k=1
Zstik
, where J is the number of destination sectors. This allows
us to have importer sector specific labor costs and productivity matched into the products
imported from different countries. Taking logs of the theoretical expression in equation (9)
and using these weights, we get the following expression for the unit values of product i
shipped from country s to country t:
ln pzsti = ln
J∑
j=1
wstijf
(
γsiγ˜stij
σ−1
)(ωtj
ϕtj
)
≈
J∑
j=1
shstij ln f (γsi) +
J∑
j=1
shstij(lnωtj − lnϕtj) (10)
In the second line we applied a log linear approximation and moved from volume shares,
wstij , to value shares, shstij , by lack of data on volume shares. shstij is the value share
of sector j in total sales of sector i in source country s to target country t defined as
shstij =
pzstij zstij
J∑
k=1
pzstikZstik
. Equation (10) shows that wages ωtj and productivity ϕtj in the
importing country have the same effect on price pZsti (with opposite sign) and thus should
be entered jointly in the regression. Therefore, we define the ratio of wages and productivity
as θtj = ωtjϕtj .
We add exporter-product-time fixed effects, νsiu, to capture variation in exporter pro-
ductivity, γsi.11 We include importer-exporter-product fixed effects, χsti, to account for the
role of distance and also of other trade costs not related to distance appearing in the model
with per unit trade costs. Moreover, we need this fixed effect to correct for differences in
measurement of unit values across sectors which are specific to country-pairs.12
While our unit value data is HS6 aggregation, the world input-output data used for the
mapping and calculation of weights is in a corresponding nace classification which is more
aggregated. Hence our explanatory variables are at a more aggregate level.
This leads to the following estimating equation with u a subscript for time:
ln pzstiu ≈ ˜θsti∗u + νsiu + χsti (11)
10The specification with a non-linear wage schedule instead of the cost function in (6) implies a linear relation
between the price of intermediates and the opportunity cost of failure, the wage relative to productivity in
the importing country. The reason is that both quality and the wage ( through the wage schedule) adjust
endogenously to the opportunity cost of failure, leading to a linear relation. Hence, a non-linear wage schedule
does not generate an elasticity different from 1. Further discussion is can be found in A.3.
11Exporter-product-time fixed effects are included to control for time varying exporter characteristics like
income and market size (Schott (2004)) and other potential omitted variables which are time varying and exporter-
product specific.
12Importer-product fixed effects are needed as well because our measure for the price of labor is an index with
a base level differing per country-sector combination.
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With ˜θsti∗u defined as follows:
˜θsti∗u = J∑
j=1
shsti∗ju ln θtju (12)
Where i∗ refers to the more aggregated nace product code corresponding to HS product level
i. Thus we explain exporter sector i specific prices between country s and t by a weighted
sum of wages and productivity in the different importer sectors j. With this approach
our explanatory variables vary by exporter, importer, and sector and have thus dimension
sti∗. The variation follows from variation in the underlying labor cost and productivity by
importer t and sector j and the value weights varying by all four dimensions. Our approach
with variation along more dimensions provides a clear advantage in comparison to most of
the papers on traded goods prices using variables that vary only at the importer country
level like GDP and GDP per capita.
Reflecting the baseline model, we estimate equation (11) first without further controls. To
compare our results with the literature on traded goods prices discussed in the introduction
and to test the extended model with per unit trade costs, we then estimate a specification
with only time fixed effects where we also include importer GDP, importer GDP per capita,
exporter GDP per capita, and distance in the regression besides importer wages relative to
productivity.
4 Data
In our empirical analysis we proxy quality with import prices, more specifically with import
unit values.13 In line with the theory we work with prices inclusive of transportation costs,
i.e. cif(cost insurance freight) prices. The data used for unit values come from the BACI
database14 which contains the quantity and the value of bilateral imports in 6-digit Har-
monized System (HS) classification. We use data for the period between 2000-2007.15 The
BACI database is constructed from COMTRADE (Commodities Trade Statistics database)
which provides very detailed trade data, accounting for more than 95% of the world trade.
BACI takes advantage of the double information on each trade flow to fill out the matrix
of bilateral world trade providing a “reconciled’ value for each flow reported at least by one
of the partners. Therefore the missing values in BACI are those concerning trade between
non-reporting countries. The data is provided in 6-digit disaggregation level. At the inter-
national level, this is the most disaggregated product classification that one can obtain. 16
We winsorize unit values at 5 and 95% to address outliers which are most likely the result
of measurement error in the unit value data 17. As a robustness check we also trimmed unit
values instead of winsorizing (for which results are presented in the Appendix) and we also
used unit values without corrections, both leading to very similar results. 18 We also drop
homogenous goods from the sample as identified by Rauch (1999) , since these products
should not have significant differences in quality. 19
13Unit values might not always be a good proxy for quality in some sectors as shown in Khandelwal (2010).
While there have been new approaches aiming to better measure quality, including Khandelwal, due to data
limitations we are not able to follow the approach in Khandelwal (2010). (We would lose roughly 80% of
the sample.). Instead, we undertake robustness checks and construct and use a measure of market power in
intermediate-input markets proposed by Kugler and Verhoogen (2012). Also see Bernini et al (2015), who follow
the approach used by Khandelwal (2010) to estimate quality and find similar results using both Khandelwal’s
measure for quality and unit values, as we use here.
14http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/baci/baciwp.pdf
15This is the period for which we were able to obtain all the required data for control variables.
16It is important to keep in mind that what consumers or firms buying intermediate goods think of as a product
is likely to be even more disaggregated than is implied by the 6-digit HS classification. For example, the product
with HS 611220 code in the HS6 classification scheme is defined as ski suits, of textile materials, knit. A consumer
is likely to consider a range of different products that fall within this same category as actually being distinct
from each other. As such, our HS6 digit level unit values are average prices for those products within these
categories.
17A similar approach has been followed in Manova and Zhang (2012).
18These results using unit values without corrections are available upon request from the authors.
19As a robustness check we also run all regressions with keeping in the homogenous goods and our results hold.
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We limit our analysis to intermediate products. The classification of products into inter-
mediate and final consumption comes from the WIOD database, which is based on the BEC
classification of the OECD (Dietzenbacher, et al., 2013; Bekkers, et al., 2012). The WIOD
database provides an update to the EU-KLEMS database. Both are large scale, multi-year
databases funded by the European Commission.20 While the WIOD mapping starts with a
reclassification of the HS6-BEC (UN) mapping at HS6 level, it is somewhat different from
the original HS6-BEC scheme. This is because more emphasis is placed under the BEC
scheme on whether goods are durables or not, with some products that clearly need process-
ing before final consumption are classified under BEC as consumption goods. For example,
televisions are classified as capital goods at HS6 level. Also, whole meat carcasses are clas-
sified as consumption goods at HS6 level under the BEC, though they are in fact bought
by industry. There are further problems due to revisions to the HS classification scheme
since the original mapping from BEC to HS was developed. Over 10 percent of current HS
lines are orphans in the BEC-HS concordance. As such, at the end of the day, the mapping
we work from WIOD better reflects both the most current HS-combined product lines, and
our need for a breakdown of products by use. Using this classification, we end up with
2467 HS-6 product categories which are defined as intermediate products while we identify
from the sample 949 as final products (and we exclude further 83 product categories which
could be both final and intermediate goods). The Annex provides details on the number
and share of observations classified as intermediate products in our sample belonging to
each HS2 category (see Tables in A.7). Figure 1 depicts both the share of intermediates and
final goods imports and their value for our sample. 21 The share of intermediates is around
58-61% for our sample, while the final goods’ share is only about 15%. Thus the importance
of intermediate goods is much more pronounced than that of the final goods, with the value
of intermediate goods imported reaching 2313 billion dollars in 2007, while the final goods
imports value amounting to 620 billion US dollars only.
Figure 1: Intermediate vs final goods imports
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20The WIOD consortium includes a number of European research centers and universities, as well as the OECD
and UNCTAD.
21The shares do not add up to 100, the remainder being those products that could not be identified as final or
intermediate goods.
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The price of labor is constructed using labor compensation per person engaged (and
as a robustness labor compensation per hour worked) obtained from the 2012 EU-KLEMS
database.22 The data are provided in local currency and so we convert them into US dollars
using exchange rates from OECD. In addition we calculate indexes from the variables, using
the same base year, 1995, as the rest of the database. Given that we are interested in the
effect of the price of labor relative to productivity, we divide labor compensation per person
with productivity of labor, which we proxy with sectoral total factor productivity from the
2012 EU-KLEMS database 23, again applying weights to map the importing sectors into
exporting sectors.
We use the value weights shstij calculated from WIOD world input-output tables as
defined in the previous section in order to convert importing country importing sector specific
data into importing country exporter sector specific variables defined in equations (11)-(12).
The world input-output table from WIOD is similar to national input-output tables except
that the use of products is broken down according to their origin. Each product is produced
either by a domestic industry or by a foreign industry. For a country A, flows of products
both for intermediate and final use are split into domestically produced or imported. In
addition, the dataset contains information on which foreign industry produced a product.
The basic data for WIOD on import flows, similarly to our unit value data, originates
from the UN COMTRADE database. The WIOD classification list has 59 products and 35
industries based on the CPA and NACE rev 1 (ISIC rev 2) classifications. The 35-industry
list is identical to the list used in the EU-KLEMS database with additional breakdown of
the transport sector. Both the price index of labor, and the weights from WIOD have the
same industry aggregation. This is then mapped into HS6-level import price data. So, unit
values are observed at the six-digit level, whereas our explanatory variables display a higher
level of aggregation.
To construct our instrument for the price of labor relative to productivity, we use the
interaction of the real exchange rate index and the share of high-skilled persons engaged.
First, to calculate the real exchange rate index, we obtained a purchasing-power-parity based
and current dollar price-based measure of gross domestic product from the International
Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database. We calculated the real exchange rate
as a ratio of gross domestic product at current US dollars prices to GDP based on PPP
valuation of the country GDP. From this we calculated the index of real exchange rate using
the same base year (1995) as used for the rest of the dataset. For the second variable, data
on the hours worked by high-skilled persons engaged (share in total hours) per sector were
obtained from the WIOD database.
The Annex Table A.4 contains summary statistics for our variables. In addition, Annex
Table A.5 and A.6 contain the list of countries included in our sample as exporters and
importers. The countries included in the sample were driven by the availability of data from
WIOD and EU-KLEMS. Since data needed to be available for importers from EU-KLEMS,
and both for exporters and importers from WIOD, the number of importers is smaller due
to less countries being available from EU-KLEMS than WIOD.
22The EU-KLEMS database contains industry-level measures of output, inputs and productivity and other
derived variables for 25 European countries, Australia, Japan and the US for the period from 1970 onwards. The
input variables include various categories of capital (K), labor (L), energy (E), material (M) and service inputs (S).
The variables are organized around the growth accounting methodology with the exception of the basic input data-
series which are derived independently from the assumptions underlying the growth-accounting method. The EU-
KLEMS database has largely been constructed on the basis of data from national statistical institutes. Nominal
and price series for output and total intermediate inputs at the industry level in the dataset are taken directly
from the National Accounts. Further information about the database can be found at http://www.euklems.net/
and in O’Mahony and Timmer (2009).
23For the countries in our sample, the correlation between TFP and labor productivity (based on WIOD and
EU-KLEMS) is close to 99%, meaning the results will be the same with either measure.
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5 Empirical Results
5.1 Instrumental variable regressions
There could be a potential for reverse causality, whereby higher imported input prices cause
higher prices of value added, or wages. Thus we estimate equation (10) over the period
2000-2007 employing an IV regression allowing for high-dimensional fixed effects. In our
main specifications we include importer-exporter-product (HS 6 level) and exporter-time-
product (HS 6 level) fixed effects. Since errors could be correlated across observations within
exporter-importer-sector we clustered standard errors at exporter-importer-sector level, at
the same dimension as our instrument and our main variable of interest.
We construct our instrument by interacting two variables. The first variable is the
importer’s real exchange rate calculated against the US dollar. The real exchange rate gives
a proxy for the cost of goods and services in the importing country and is driven to a
large extent by Balassa-Samuelson effects generating higher price levels in more productive
countries. Employing the real exchange rate, we capture variation in the price of labor that is
not driven by prices of intermediates but instead by the strength of the Balassa-Samuelson
effect. For example, in a very rich country like Switzerland, there is a strong Balassa-
Samuelson effect generating high wage levels and we capture this strong Balassa-Samuelson
effect with the real exchange rate. The second variable used to construct our instrument is
the hours worked by high-skilled persons engaged as a share of total hours worked per sector.
This variable varies by time, importer and sector. To construct our instrument we interact
the two variables.24 The motivation for this sectoral variable is that more skilled workers
have a stronger bargaining position vis-a-vis employers and will thus be able to negotiate
a better ratio of wage relative to productivity. Hence, the Balassa-Samuelson effect will
have a stronger effect in sectors with a larger share of high-skilled workers. Indeed our
combined instrument has a higher correlation when the share of skilled workers is higher
(the correlation is about 20% for the sample with the share of skilled workers being below
the sample mean, and about 55% for the sample with above average skilled worker share).
Table 1 presents the results of our main specifications (first stage results are presented in
Annex Table A.2). In the first column of the table, we only include the price of labor relative
to productivity as explanatory variable (which is constructed as the (weighted average) price
of labor divided by productivity ). 25 As expected, based on our theoretical model, the
cost of production in the importer country measured by the labor cost given productivity
increases the import price of the intermediate goods. A 10 percent increase in the price of
labor relative to productivity leads to about 6.3 percent increase in the price of imported
goods. In other words, countries where workers (or the production process in general) are
more expensive will import more expensive intermediate goods (which are also more likely
to be of higher quality) for further processing. At the bottom of the table we also present
test results for under-identification and weak instruments which indicate that we do not
have a problem of weak instrument.
Results presented in column (2) include two additional control variables, GDP per capita,
measuring the level of development of the country, and GDP, measuring market size. The
coefficient on the price of labor relative to productivity becomes higher, implying that a one
percent increase in the cost of labor (relative to productivity) increases the price of imported
intermediates by about 2.5%. In addition, market size has a negative impact on imported
good prices while GDP per capita has a positive impact. The result on market size provides
support for models where the intensity of competition rises with market size (Hummels
and Lugovskyy (2009)). Furthermore, the finding that labor compensation matters even
when GDP per capita is controlled for provides further support for our model. In the
Sutton-model of Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) higher priced intermediates are caused by a
stronger demand for quality (or higher priced products) by consumers (proxied by GDP per
capita) while wages at the sector level should not matter under the model’s predictions. Our
24We find an about 36 percent correlation in our sample between our constructed instrument and the price of
labor relative to productivity.
25As a robustness check we also run our regressions including labor price index and productivity separately
(results are available upon request from the authors). Our main variable of interest, price of labor, remains
positive and significant in all different specifications.
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Table 1: IV Estimation Results, intermediate goods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln pzsti ln pzsti ln pzsti ln pzsti˜θsti∗u 0.633 2.477 2.475 1.431
(5.40)*** (5.32)*** (5.32)*** (2.05)**
LnGDPt -4.844 -4.842 -3.244
(6.74)*** (6.74)*** (3.32)***
LnGDPpercapitat 4.479 4.478 3.049
(7.00)*** (7.00)*** (3.55)***
Lndistancest 0.179
(17.40)***
LnGDPpercapitas 0.174
(8.84)***
HIt 0.014 0.032
(3.50)*** (3.94)***
Countrypair-HS6 fe. YES YES YES NO
Exporter-HS6-year fe. YES YES YES NO
Exporter fe. NO NO NO YES
Importer fe. NO NO NO YES
HS6-year fe. NO NO NO YES
LM test for underid 478.98 146.72 146.57 36.33
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-stat for weak id 555.95 134.86 134.72 41.66
R2 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.54
N 6,584,575 6,584,575 6,584,575 6,755,827
a Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by importer-exporter-sector.
b *** p < 0.01 , ** p < 0.05 , * p < 0.1
c The sample is restricted to intermediate goods. The dependent variable, ln pzsti , is
the product-level unit value of imports from country s to country t. ˜θsti∗u is labor
compensation per person engaged divided by productivity in importing country
t, specific to sector i∗ imported from country s, HI is the Herfindahl index in
importing country t. Results for the first stage results are presented in the Annex
table A.2.
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empirical results instead show that wages at the sector level stay significant once controlling
for GDP per capita, providing support for our model.
Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) show that imperfect competition in input markets can
influence input prices. In particular, they find evidence on the importance of endogenous
markups, costs differences, and imperfect competition in the input side to explain prices.
Hence, we extend our specification in column (3) including a proxy for the level of market
power in the intermediate-input side using a Herfindahl index for suppliers of each six-digit
intermediate good, defined as the sum of squared market shares of exporters of the input.
Controlling for the intermediate-input side market power does not alter the effect of labor
cost (relative to productivity). In addition, our results indicate a significant and positive
relationship between higher level of market power of intermediate suppliers/exporters and
higher import prices of these goods.
Finally, in the last column, we also control for the distance between the exporter and
importer and for the exporter’s level of development (by including the log of exporter’s
country GDP per capita). This also implies that instead of including country-pair-product
and exporter-product-year fixed effects, we include exporter, importer, and product-year
fixed effects. This specification enables us to explore how import prices vary in a cross-
section way with our main variable of interest. We find that our main variable of interest,
the price of labor relative to productivity, still has a positive and significant impact on the
price of imported inputs. In addition, both distance and GDP per capita of the exporter
have the expected sign (in line with earlier findings in the literature (Hummels and Skiba,
2004; Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011; Martin, 2012; Schott, 2004)).26
5.2 Robustness checks
If the mechanism we propose in this paper is indeed the one behind the results presented in
the previous section, we expect that the labor cost is not significant or much less important
in explaining the variation in imported goods prices of final goods. In addition, when quality
differences are not present, which is the case of homogenous goods, again we expect that the
price of labor is not driving imported goods’ prices. In order to verify this, in this section
we present results using a final goods and homogeneous goods sample.
The first three columns of table 2 show results for our main specification using final goods
while the last three present results for homogenous goods (first stage results are presented
in the Annex in Table A.3). The cost of labor (given productivity) is insignificant in all
specifications and the country-level variables are explaining the variation in imported goods
prices both in the case of final and homogenous goods.
As further robustness we run our main specifications trimming the imported goods prices
instead of winsorizing. Our results hold ( results can be found in the annex Table A.1).
5.3 Economic significance
We also undertake a Shapley decomposition based on IV regressions separately for interme-
diate and final goods.27 A summary of this decomposition can be found in Table 3. We
find that while in the case of intermediate goods the price of labor explains about 20% of
variation in the imported good prices (share being calculated excluding the fixed effects), in
the case of final goods this is only 1.9%. In other words, while sector-country-specific wages
explain about one-fifth of the variation in highly disaggregated intermediate goods prices,
wages are only marginally important in explaining final goods prices, providing further evi-
dence consistent with the O-ring theory. In addition, this indicates that not controlling for
destination-sector specific wage effects is likely to generate a significant omitted variables
bias.
26Hummels and Skiba (2004) find that free on board (fob) prices, so prices exclusive of transport costs, are
rising in distance. This provides support for their Washington apples effect (terminology from Feensta and
Romalis, 2014) that quality rises with distance. Since distance is not our main variable of interest we stick to the
use of cif prices, so prices inclusive of transport costs. Since distance obviously raises transport costs and thus
also cif-prices, our empirical results on distance could also be driven by this effect through transport costs. The
results do, however, not contradict the Washington apples effect.
27Due to computational difficulties instead of HS6-year fixed effects, sector-year fixed effects.
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Table 2: IV results with final and homogenous goods
Final goods sample Homogenous goods sample
(1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7)
ln pzsti ln pzsti ln pzsti ln pzsti ln pzsti ln pzsti˜θsti∗u -0.056 0.112 -0.102 -0.400 1.533 -0.050
(0.19) (0.06) (0.28) (1.12) (1.26) (0.12)
LnGDPt -1.928 -1.536 -2.361 -0.553
(1.42) (3.62)*** (2.18)** (1.13)
LnGDPpercapitat 1.951 1.556 2.120 0.458
(1.66)* (3.92)*** (2.18)** (1.00)
Lndistancest 0.121 0.157
(10.65)*** (13.20)***
LnGDPpercapitas 0.267 0.173
(9.33)*** (5.65)***
Countrypair-HS6 fe. YES YES NO YES YES NO
Exporter-HS6-year fe. YES YES NO YES YES NO
Exporter fe. NO NO YES NO NO YES
Importer fe. NO NO YES NO NO YES
HS6-year fe. NO NO YES NO NO YES
LM test for underid 199.45 12.02 74.00 102.88 13.87 55.63
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-stat for weak id 197.23 10.74 125.45 93.51 13.10 75.98
R2 0.84 0.84 0.67 0.82 0.82 0.59
N 1,977,513 1,977,513 2,018,782 567,499 567,499 603,775
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by importer-exporter-sector.
*** p < 0.01 , ** p < 0.05 , * p < 0.1
The sample is restricted to intermediate goods. The dependent variable, ln pzsti , is
the product-level unit value of imports from country s to country t. ˜θsti∗u is labor
compensation per person engaged divided by productivity in importing country t,
specific to sector i∗ imported from country s. Results for the first stage results are
presented in the Annex Table A.3.
Table 3: Shapley decomposition, percentage of variation explained
Intermediate sample Final sample˜θsti∗u 20.0% 1.9%
LnGDPpercapitat 6.0% 12.2%
LnGDPt, Lndistancest, LnGDPpercapitas 74.0% 85.9%
Shapley decomposition is based on IV regression results using sector-year instead
of product-year fixed effects due to computational difficulties. The shares above
are calculated excluding the variation explained by fixed-effects.
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6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
Intermediate goods trade amounts to roughly two-thirds of world merchandise trade. Even
so, the empirical and theoretical literature on traded goods prices has thus far concentrated
on final goods and neglected intermediate goods. In this paper, we fill this gap in the
literature, studying the relation between traded goods prices of intermediates and importer
characteristics.
We first develop a simple model of production with final goods produced from interme-
diates and labor where the production process is vulnerable to failure and the probability
of failure is declining in the quality of intermediates. Countries with a higher price of labor
relative to productivity have a higher opportunity cost of failure. Therefore they demand
higher quality intermediates. Including per unit trade costs, our model also contains a
Washington apples effect with traded goods prices rising in distance.
In the empirical section we use import prices from a large disaggregated dataset contain-
ing bilateral imports at 6-digit HS classification. Intermediate goods are identified in our
dataset using a classification scheme developed for an update of the EU-KLEMS database.
Using WIOD input-output tables and the EU-KLEMS database we create an exporter-
sector-importer specific labor price also varying over time. As such, our main explanatory
variable is varying by time, sector and country-pair, an important advantage relative to
most of the literature on traded goods prices using country level variables. We work with
instrumental variable regressions to establish causality.
Our results show that labor costs relative to productivity in the importing country exert
a positive, significant effect on traded goods prices for intermediate goods. Countries with
more expensive production factors (higher priced workers) import higher quality, higher
priced intermediate goods for further processing. These results also hold after controlling
for market size and the level of development of the importing country. Basically, while we
may observe systematic variation in import prices for both final and intermediate goods,
the factors driving these patterns are different for intermediates than those for final goods.
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A Supplementary Derivations, Data Summary, and Sup-
plementary Regressions
A.1 Deriving Optimal Quality, Quantity and Price in Baseline Model
Final goods producers minimize costs
Itj∑
i=1
pZstij (φstij) zstij + ωtjVtj with pZstij (φstij) given
in equation (7) subject to the production function in equations (4) and (5). The choice
variables are the quantity of value added Vtj , the quantity of intermediates zstij , and the
quality of intermediates φstij . The respective first order conditions are given by:28
ωtj − λ
 Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
(Z η−1ηtj + (ϕtjVtj) η−1η ) 1η−1 αvtjϕ η−1ηtj V − 1ηtj = 0 (A.1)
pZstij − λ
 Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
(Z η−1ηtj + (ϕtjVtj) η−1η ) 1η−1 αztjZ− 1ηtj Z 1σtj (zstij)− 1σ = 0 (A.2)
γsiφ
γsi−1
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
zstij − λξ Xtj
φstij
= 0 (A.3)
Solving for zstij from equation (A.2) gives:
zstij =
PσZtj
pσZstij
Ztj (A.4)
With
pZtj =
 Itj∑
i=1
p1−σZstij
 11−σ (A.5)
Substituting equation (A.4) back into the FOC for zstij , equation (A.2), leads to:
PZtj = λ
 Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
(Z η−1ηtj + (ϕtjVtj) η−1η ) 1η−1 αztjZ− 1ηtj (A.6)
Dividing the FOC for Vtj and Ztj in equations (A.1) and (A.6) gives:
Vtj =
(
PZtj
ωtj
αvtj
αztj
)η
ϕη−1tj Ztj (A.7)
Substituting back into the production function, equation (4), we find the following solutions
for Vtj and Ztj :29
Vtj = αηvtjϕ
η−1
tj ω
−η
tj
 Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
η−1 P ηXtjXtj (A.8)
Ztj = αηztjP
−η
Ztj
Xtj
 Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
η−1 P ηXtj (A.9)
With
PXtj =
1
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
(
αηztjP
1−η
Ztj
+ αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj
) 1
1−η (A.10)
28We also could have used two stage budgeting, but we decided to expose a straightforward derivation, as the
lower nest seems non-homothetic with quality playing a role casting doubts about the appropriateness of two
stage budgeting.
29Derivation of this equation and several equations below can be found in a separate appendix available upon
request.
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Substituting equation (A.8) into equation (A.1) generates the following expression for λ:
λ = PXtj (A.11)
Dividing the FOC for φstij , equation (A.3), by a similar equation with different subscript
and substituting equation (7), gives us:
φstij =
(
γuk
γsi
) 1
γsi(1−σ)
(
τutkjωuk
τstijωsi
ϕsi
ϕuk
) 1
γsi
φ
γuk
γsi
utkj (A.12)
Substituting equation (A.12) into equation (A.5) implies for pZi :
pZtj = pzstijI
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij ; γ˜stij =
 1
Itj
Itj∑
k=1
(
γsi
γuk
) 11−σ (A.13)
Substituting the expression for Ztj , equation (A.4), the expression for λ, equation (A.11),
and the expression for pZi , equation (A.13), into the FOC of φstij , equation (A.3) leads to:
γsiφ
γsi
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
(
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij
)σ
αηZtjP
−η
Ztj
(A.14)
−
 Itj∏
i=1
φξvtlj
ξ(1−η) P 1−ηXtj ξ = 0
Using equation (7) and (A.13), we can rewrite as follows:
γsiφ
γsi
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
(
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij
)σ
= φγsistij
τstijωsi
dsi
pstijI
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stijξ
+ αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj α
−η
Ztj
(
φγsistij
τstijωsi
dsi
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij
)η
ξ (A.15)
And solving for φstij :
φγsistij =
ϕsi
τstijωsi
1
I
1
1−σ
tj
γ˜stij(
γsiγ˜stij
σ−1
ξItj
− 1
) 1
1−η
(
αvtj
αZtj
) η
1−η
(
ωtj
ϕtj
)
(A.16)
A.2 Model with Per Unit Trade Costs
We add per unit trade costs astij to the baseline model and to keep the model tractable we
work with a Cobb Douglas aggregator of intermediates instead of CES. The remainder of
the model stays the same. Production is given by equation (4), but with Ztj defined by:
Ztj =
Itj∏
i=1
Zβstij ; β =
1
Itj
(A.17)
The cost function is as in equation (6), but the cif price of intermediate good i used in
country t and sourced from country s is now:
pZstij = φ
γ
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
+ astij (A.18)
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Minimizing costs
Itj∑
i=1
pZstijzstij + ωtjVtj subject to the production function in equations (4)
and (A.17) with pZstij defined in equation (A.18) leads to the following first order conditions:
ωtj − λ
 Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
(Z η−1ηtj + (ϕtjVtj) η−1η ) 1η−1 αvtjϕ η−1ηtj V − 1ηtj = 0 (A.19)
pZstij − λ
 Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
(Z η−1ηtj + (ϕtjVtj) η−1η ) 1η−1 αztjZ− 1ηtj Ztjzstij = 0 (A.20)
γsiφ
γsi−1
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
zstij − λξ Xtj
φstij
= 0 (A.21)
The expressions for Ztj , Vtj and λ remain the same and are still given by equations (A.9),
(A.8) and (A.11). For zstij we can easily find:
zstij = β
PZtj
pZstij
Ztj (A.22)
With
pZtj =
Itj∏
i=1
(
pZstij
β
)β
(A.23)
Substituting equations (A.9) and (A.22) into (A.21) gives:
γsiφ
γsi−1
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
β
PZtj
pZstij
αηztjP
−η
Ztj
Xtj
 Itj∏
i=1
φξvtlj
 η−1P ηXtj (A.24)
−λξ Xtj
φstij
= 0
Dividing equation (A.24) by a similar equation with different subscript and substituting
equation (A.18), gives us:
φγukutkj = φ
γsi
stij
autkj
astij
τstij
τutkj
ωsi
ωuk
ϕuk
ϕsi
(A.25)
Substituting equation (A.25) into equation (A.23) implies for pZtj :
pZtj = pZstij
a˜utkj
βastij
; a˜utkj =
Itj∏
k=1
aβutkj (A.26)
Substituting equations (A.25) and (A.26) back into equation (A.24) leads after several steps
to:
φγsistijτstij
ωsi
ϕsi
a˜utkj
astij
(
γsi
ξ
− 1
β
)
= a˜utkj
β
(A.27)
+
(
ωtj
ϕtj
)1−η
αηvtjα
−η
ztj
(
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
a˜utkj
βastij
+ a˜utkj
β
)η
We assume that γsiβ > ξ to guarantee a positive solution for φstij . We cannot solve equation
(A.27) for optimal quality. Still, we can derive comparative statics on the effect of changes in
per unit trade costs astij , iceberg trade costs τstij and the price of labor given productivity
in the importing country, ωtjϕtj :
γsiφ̂stij = âstij − τ̂stij+ Astij (1− η)(1−AstijBstijη)
ω̂tj
ϕtj
(A.28)
+ Astijη(1−AstijBstijη)
α̂Vtj
αZtj
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With
Astij =
(
ωtj
ϕtj
)1−η ( αvtj
αZtj
)η (
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
a˜utkj
βastij
+ a˜utkjβ
)η
a˜utkj
β +
(
ωtj
ϕtj
)1−η ( αvtj
αZtj
)η (
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
a˜utkj
βastij
+ a˜utkjβ
)η
Bstij =
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
a˜utkj
βastij
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
a˜utkj
βastij
+ a˜utkjβ
With the cif price positively dependent upon the quality level and γβ > ξ and η < 1 as
assumed, we can draw the following conclusions from expression (A.28). The quality and
traded goods price of intermediate imports into country t from country s are rising in per
unit trade costs astij , the wage relative to productivity in the importing country ωtjϕtj and the
labor taste shifter αVtj and declining in the iceberg trade costs τstij and the taste shifter of
intermediate inputs αZtj . The effects of the different types of trade costs in the model are
in line with the work of Hummels and Skiba (2004) on shipping the good apples out. The
effects of the wage relative to productivity and the labor and intermediates taste shifters
are in line with the baseline model above.
A.3 Model with Non-Linear Wage Schedule
The cost function of producing an intermediate of quality φstij is given by:
C (zstij , φstij) = zstij
ωsi (φstij)
ϕsi
(A.29)
The quality-wage schedule is given by the following non-linear function:
ωsi (φstij) = νsiφκsistij (A.30)
Cost minimization of final goods producers leads to the same first order conditions for Vtj
and zstij as in A.1, equations (A.1)-(A.2). The first order condition for φstij becomes:
τstijκsiνsiφ
κsi−1
stij
ϕsi
zstij − λξ Xtj
φstij
= 0 (A.31)
Marginal cost pricing of intermediate goods producers implies:
pZstij =
τstijνsiφ
κsi
stij
ϕsi
(A.32)
Dividing the FOC for φstij by a similar equation with different subscript and substituting
the expression for the price of intermediates in equation (A.32) gives:
φstij =
(
κukνuk
κsiνsi
) 1
κsi(1−σ)
(
τutkj
τstij
ϕsi
ϕuk
) 1
κsi
φ
κuk
κsi
utkj (A.33)
Substituting equation (A.33) into equation (A.5) implies for pZi :
pZtj = pzstijI
1
1−σ
tj ˜κνstij ; κ˜stij =
 1
Itj
Itj∑
k=1
(
κsiνsi
κukνuk
) 11−σ (A.34)
Substituting the expression for Ztj , equation (A.4), the expression for λ, equation (A.11),
and the expression for pZi , equation (A.34), into the FOC of φstij , equation (A.31) leads to:
τstijκsiνsiφ
κsi
stij
ϕsi
(
I
1
1−σ
tj ˜κνstij)σ αηZtjP−ηZtj (A.35)
−
 Itj∏
i=1
φξvtlj
ξ(1−η) P 1−ηXtj ξ = 0
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Using equations (A.34) and (A.32), we can rewrite as follows:
τstijκsiνsiφ
κsi
stij
ϕsi
(
I
1
1−σ
tj ˜κνstij)σ = τstijνsiφκsistijϕsi I 11−σtj ˜κνstijξ
+ αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj α
−η
Ztj
(
τstijνsiφ
κsi
stij
ϕsi
I
1
1−σ
tj ˜κνstij)η ξ (A.36)
And solving for φstij :
φκsistij =
ϕsi
τstijνsi
1
I
1
1−σ
tj
γ˜stij(
κsi
ξ
(
I
1
1−σ
tj ˜κνstij)σ−1 − 1
) 1
1−η
(
αvtj
αZtj
) η
1−η
(
ωtj
ϕtj
)
(A.37)
So from marginal cost pricing in equation (A.32), we get:
pZstij =
1
I
1
1−σ
tj
γ˜stij(
κsi
ξ
(
I
1
1−σ
tj ˜κνstij)σ−1 − 1
) 1
1−η
(
αvtj
αZtj
) η
1−η
(
ωtj
ϕtj
)
(A.38)
Hence, also with a non-linear wage schedule the price of intermediates rises linearly in
opportunity cost of failure, the wage relative to productivity in the importing country. The
reason is that both quality and the wage (through the wage schedule) adjust endogenously
to the opportunity cost of failure, leading to a linear relation.
A.4 Derivations Suporting Sections A.1, A.2, and A.3
A.4.1 Deriving Equation (A.7)
Dividing the FOC for Ei and Zi in equations (A.1) and (A.6) gives:
PZtj
ωtj
=
λ
(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
)(
Z
η−1
η
tj + (ϕtjVtj)
η−1
η
) 1
η−1
αztjZ
− 1η
tj
λ
(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
)(
Z
η−1
η
tj + (ϕtjVtj)
η−1
η
) 1
η−1
αvtjϕ
η−1
η
tj V
− 1η
tj
PZtj
ωtj
αvtj
αztj
ϕ
η−1
η
tj =
Z
− 1η
tj
V
− 1η
tj
Ztj =
(
ωtj
PZtj
αztj
αvtj
)η 1
ϕη−1tj
Vtj
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A.4.2 Deriving Equation (A.8)
Substituting equation (A.7) into equation (4) gives:
Xtj =
(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
)
×
(
αztj (Ztj)
η−1
η + αvtj
(
dtj
(
PZtj
ωtj
αvtj
αztj
)η
ϕη−1tj Ztj
) η−1
η
) η
η−1
=
(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
)(
αztj (Ztj)
η−1
η + αvtj
((
PZtj
ωtj
αvtj
αztj
)η
ϕηtjZtj
) η−1
η
) η
η−1
=
(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
)(
αztj (Ztj)
η−1
η + αvtj
(
PZtj
ωtj
αvtj
αztj
)η−1
ϕη−1tj Z
η−1
η
tj
) η
η−1
=
(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
)(
αztj (Ztj)
η−1
η + αηvtjα
1−η
ztj
(
PZtj
ωtj
)η−1
ϕη−1tj Z
η−1
η
tj
) η
η−1
= Ztjα−ηztjP
η
Ztj
(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
)(
αηztjP
1−η
Ztj
+ αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj
) η
η−1
Solving for Ztj :
Ztj = αηztjP
−η
Ztj
Xtj(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
)ξ (αηztjP 1−ηZtj + αηvtjω1−ηtj ϕη−1tj ) η1−η
Total expenditure is therefore given by:
PZtjZtj +ωtjVtj
=
(
αηztjP
1−η
Ztj
+ αηvtjϕ
η−1
tj ω
1−η
tj
) Xtj
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
×
(
αηztjP
1−η
Ztj
+ αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj
) η
1−η
= 1
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
(
αηztjP
1−η
Ztj
+ αηvtjϕ
η−1
tj ω
1−η
tj
) 1
1−η
Xtj
We can therefore define the price index PXtj as follows:
PXtj =
1
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
(
αηztjP
1−η
Ztj
+ αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj
) 1
1−η
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Ztj and Vtj can now be written as follows:
Ztj = αηztjP
−η
Ztj
Xtj
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
(
αηztjP
1−η
Ztj
+ αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj
) η
1−η
= αηztjP
−η
Ztj
Xtj
 Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
(η−1)
×
 1Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
(
αηztjP
1−η
Ztj
+ αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj
) 1
1−η

η
= αηztjP
−η
Ztj
Xtj
 Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
(η−1) P ηXtj
Vtj = αηvtjϕ
η−1
tj ω
−η
tj
 Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
(η−1) P ηXtjXtj
A.4.3 Deriving Equation (A.11)
Substituting equation (A.8) into equation (A.1), followed by a bit of manipulation, generates
an expression for λ:
ωtj − λ
(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
)(
Z
η−1
η
tj + (ϕtjVtj)
η−1
η
) 1
η−1
αvtjϕ
η−1
η
tj V
− 1
η
tj = 0
ωtj − λ
(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
)(
Z
η−1
η
tj + (ϕtjVtj)
η−1
η
) 1
η−1
αvtjd
η−1
η
tj
×
αηvtjϕη−1tj ω−ηtj
(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
)(η−1)
P ηXtjXtj
−
1
η
= 0
PXtj − λ
(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
)(
Z
η−1
η
tj + (ϕtjVtj)
η−1
η
) 1
η−1
(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
) 1−η
η
X
− 1
η
tj = 0
PXtj − λ
(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
)(
Z
η−1
η
tj + (ϕtjVtj)
η−1
η
) 1
η−1
(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
) 1−η
η
×
((
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
)(
Z
η−1
η
tj + (ϕtjVtj)
η−1
η
) η
η−1
)− 1
η
= 0
PXtj − λ
(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
)(
Z
η−1
η
tj + (ϕtjVtj)
η−1
η
) 1
η−1
(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
) 1−η
η
×
(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
)− 1
η (
Z
η−1
η
tj + (ϕtjVtj)
η−1
η
)− 1
η−1
= 0
PXtj = λ
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A.4.4 Deriving Equation (A.12)
Substituting equation (A.4) into the FOC for φstij , equation (A.3), gives:
γsiφ
γsi−1
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
PσZtj
pσZstij
Ztj − λξ Xtj
φstij
= 0
Substituting equation (7) leads to:
γsiφ
γsi−1
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
PσZtj(
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
)σZtj − λξ Xtjφstij = 0
Rearranging and defining a similar equation for φutkj leads to:
γsiφ
γsi(1−σ)
stij
(
τstijωsi
ϕsi
)1−σ
PσZtjZtj − λξXtj = 0
γukφ
γuk(1−σ)
utkj
(
τutkjωuk
ϕuk
)1−σ
PσZtjZtj − λξXtj = 0
Combining the two equations:
γsiφ
γsi(1−σ)
stij
(
τstijωsi
ϕsi
)1−σ
= γukφγuk(1−σ)utkj
(
τutkjωuk
ϕuk
)1−σ
φ
γsi(1−σ)
stij =
γuk
γsi
(
τutkjωuk
τstijωsi
ϕsi
ϕuk
)1−σ
φ
γuk(1−σ)
utkj
φstij =
(
γuk
γsi
) 1
γsi(1−σ)
(
τutkjωuk
τstijωsi
ϕsi
ϕuk
) 1
γsi
φ
γuk
γsi
utkj
A.4.5 Deriving Equation (A.13)
Substituting equation (A.12) into equation (A.5) leads to:
pZtj =
(
Itj∑
i=1
(
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
)1−σ) 11−σ
=
(
Itj∑
i=1
(((
γuk
γsi
) 1
γsi(1−σ)
(
τutkjωuk
τstijωsi
ϕsi
ϕuk
) 1
γsi
φ
γuk
γsi
utkj
)γsi
τstijωsi
ϕsi
)1−σ) 11−σ
=
(
Itj∑
i=1
(((
γuk
γsi
) 1
(1−σ)
(
τutkjωuk
τstijωsi
ϕsi
ϕuk
)
φ
γuk
utkj
)
τstijωsi
ϕsi
)1−σ) 11−σ
=
(
Itj∑
i=1
((
γuk
γsi
) 1
(1−σ)
(
τutkjωuk
ϕuk
)
φ
γuk
utkj
)1−σ) 11−σ
=
(
τutkjωuk
ϕuk
)
φ
γuk
utkj
(
Itj∑
i=1
(
γuk
γsi
)) 11−σ
= pzutkj
(
Itj∑
i=1
(
γuk
γstiji
)) 11−σ
= pzstij
(
Itj∑
k=1
(
γsi
γutkjk
)) 11−σ
= pzstij I
1
1−σ
tj
(
1
Itj
Itj∑
k=1
(
γsi
γutkjk
)) 11−σ
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We can rewrite this expression as follows:
pZtj = pzstijI
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij ; γ˜stij =
 1
Itj
Itj∑
k=1
(
γsi
γutkjk
) 11−σ
A.4.6 Deriving Equation (A.14)
First rewrite equation (A.3) as follows using equations (A.4) and (A.11):
γsiφ
γsi−1
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
zstij − λξ Xtj
φstij
= 0
γsiφ
γsi−1
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
PσZtj
pσZtsij
Ztj − λξ Xtj
φstij
= 0
γsiφ
γsi−1
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
PσZtj
pσZtsij
αηztjP
−η
Ztj
 Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
(η−1) P ηXtjXtj − PXtjξ Xtjφstij = 0
Substitute the expression for
PσZtj
pσ
Ztsij
from equation (A.13) and rearrange:
γsiφ
γsi
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
(
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij
)σ
αηZtjP
−η
Ztj
 Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
(η−1) P ηXtj − PXtjξ = 0
γsiφ
γsi
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
(
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij
)σ
αηZtjP
−η
Ztj
−
 Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
(1−η) P 1−ηXtj ξ = 0
A.4.7 Deriving Equation (A.15)
Substituting equation (A.10) and rearranging equation (A.14) gives:
γsiφ
γsi
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
(
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij
)σ
αηZtjP
−η
Ztj
−
(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
)(1−η)
1(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
)(1−η) × (αηztjP 1−ηZtj + αηvtjω1−ηtj ϕη−1tj ) ξ = 0
γsiφ
γsi
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
(
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij
)σ
αηZtjP
−η
Ztj
−
(
αηztjP
1−η
Ztj
+ αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj
)
ξ = 0
γsiφ
γsi
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
(
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij
)σ
−
(
αηztjP
1−η
Ztj
+ αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj
)
α−ηZtjP
η
Ztj
ξ = 0
γsiφ
γsi
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
(
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij
)σ
−
(
PZtj + α
η
vtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj α
−η
Ztj
P ηZtj
)
ξ = 0
Further substituting equations (7) and (A.13) leads to equation (A.15).
γsiφ
γsi
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
(
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij
)σ
= pzstijI
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stijξ
+αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj α
−η
Ztj
(
pzstij γ˜tj
)η
ξ
γsiφ
γsi
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
(
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij
)σ
= φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stijξ
+αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj α
−η
Ztj
(
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij
)η
ξ
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A.4.8 Deriving Equation (A.16)
Start from equation (A.15) and solve for φijimm:
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij
(
γsi
ξ
(
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij
)σ−1
− 1
)
= αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj α
−η
Ztj
(
σ
σ − 1φ
γsi
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij
)η
(
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij
)1−η (
γsi
ξ
(
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij
)σ−1
− 1
)
= αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj α
−η
Ztj
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij
= 1(
γsi
ξ
(
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij
)σ−1
− 1
) 1
1−η
(
αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj α
−η
Ztj
) 1
1−η
φγsistij =
ϕsi
τstijωsi
1
I
1
1−σ
tj
γ˜stij(
γsi
ξ
(
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij
)σ−1
− 1
) 1
1−η
(
αvtj
αZtj
) η
1−η
(
ωtj
ϕtj
)
A.4.9 Deriving Equation (A.25)
We divide equation (A.24) by a similar equation with intermediate subscript l and substitute
equation (A.18):
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
pZstij
=
φγukutkj
τutkjωuk
ϕuk
pZutkj
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
+ astij
=
φγukutkj
τutkjωuk
ϕuk
φγukutkj
τutkjωuk
ϕuk
+ autkj
1
1 + astij
φ
γsi
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
= 11 + autkj
φ
γuk
utkj
τutkjωuk
ϕuk
astij
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
= autkj
φγukutkj
τutkjωuk
ϕuk
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
= astij
autkj
φγukutkj
τutkjωuk
ϕuk
φγukutkj = φ
γsi
stij
autkj
astij
τstij
τutkj
ωsi
ωuk
ϕuk
ϕsi
25
A.4.10 Deriving Equation (A.26)
We substitute equation (A.25) into equation (A.23):
pZtj =
Itj∏
k=1
(
pZutkj
β
)β
=
Itj∏
k=1
(
φγukutkj
τutkjωuk
ϕuk
+ autkj
β
)β
=
Itj∏
k=1
(
φγsistij
autkj
astij
τstij
τutkj
ωsi
ωuk
ϕuk
ϕsi
τutkjωuk
ϕuk
+ autkj
β
)β
=
Itj∏
k=1
(
φγsistij
autkj
astij
τstij
ωsi
ϕsi
+ autkj
β
)β
=
Itj∏
k=1

(
φ
γsi
stij
astij
τstij
ωsi
ϕsi
+ 1
)
autkj
β

β
=
Itj∏
k=1

(
φγsistijτstij
ωsi
ϕsi
+ astij
)
autkj
astij
β
β
=
Itj∏
k=1

(
φγsistijτstij
ωsi
ϕsi
+ astij
)
autkj
astij
β
β
= pZstij
Itj∏
k=1
aβutkj
βastij
= pZstij
a˜utkj
βastij
; a˜utkj =
Itj∏
k=1
aβutkj
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A.4.11 Deriving Equation (A.27)
Substituting equations (A.25) and (A.26) back into equation (A.24), we get:
γsiφ
γsi
stij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
β
PZtj
pZstij
αηztjP
−η
Ztj
 Itj∏
i=1
φξvtlj
η−1 P ηXtj − λξ = 0
γsi
astij
autkj
τutkj
τstij
ωuk
ωsi
ϕsi
ϕuk
φγukutkj
τstijωsi
ϕsi
β
a˜utkj
βastij
αηztjP
−η
Ztj
 Itj∏
i=1
φξvtlj
η−1 P ηXtj
−PXtjξ = 0
γsiφ
γuk
utkjτutkj
ωuk
ϕuk
a˜utkj
autkj
−
 Itj∏
i=1
φξvtljPXtj
1−η α−ηztjP ηZtjξ = 0
γsiφ
γuk
utkjτutkj
ωuk
ϕuk
a˜utkj
autkj
− α−ηztjP ηZtjξ ×
Itj∏
i=1
φξvtlj
1
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
(
αηztjP
1−η
Ztj
+ αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj
) 1
1−η

1−η
= 0
γsiφ
γuk
utkjτutkj
ωuk
ϕuk
a˜utkj
autkj
− α−ηztjP ηZtjξ ×(
αηztjP
1−η
Ztj
+ αηvtj
(
ωtj
ϕtj
)1−η)
= 0
γsiφ
γuk
utkjτutkj
ωuk
ϕuk
a˜utkj
autkj
−
(
PZtj + αηvtjα
−η
ztjP
η
Ztj
(
ωtj
ϕtj
)1−η)
ξ = 0
Substituting equations (A.18) and (A.26), changing the subscript index and rearranging we
get:
γsiφ
γsi
stijτstij
ωsi
ϕsi
a˜utkj
astij
=
(
PZtj + αηvtjα
−η
ztjP
η
Ztj
(
ωtj
ϕtj
)1−η)
ξ
γsi
ξ
φγsistijτstij
ωsi
ϕsi
a˜utkj
astij
=
(
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
+ astij
)
a˜utkj
βastij
+
(
αηvtjα
−η
ztj
((
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
+ astij
)
a˜utkj
βastij
)η (
ωtj
ϕtj
)1−η)
γsi
ξ
φγsistijτstij
ωsi
ϕsi
a˜utkj
astij
=
(
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
+ astij
)
a˜utkj
βastij
+
(
ωtj
ϕtj
)1−η
αηvtjα
−η
ztj
((
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
+ astij
)
a˜utkj
βastij
)η
φγsistijτstij
ωsi
ϕsi
a˜utkj
astij
(
γsi
ξ
− 1
β
)
= a˜utkj
β
+
(
ωtj
ϕtj
)1−η ( αvtj
αZtj
)η (
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
a˜utkj
βastij
+ a˜utkj
β
)η
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A.4.12 Deriving Equation (A.28)
Log differentiating equation (A.27) with respect to astij , τstij , ωtjϕtj and
αvtj
αZtj
gives us:
γsiφ̂stij + τ̂stij − âstij = Astij (1− η) ω̂tj
ϕtj
+Astijη
α̂Vtj
αZtj
+AstijBstijη
(
γsiφ̂stij + τ̂stij +
ω̂si
ϕsi
− âstij
)
With
Astij =
(
ωtj
ϕtj
)1−η ( αvtj
αZtj
)η (
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
a˜utkj
βastij
+ a˜utkjβ
)η
a˜utkj
β +
(
ωtj
ϕtj
)1−η ( αvtj
αZtj
)η (
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
a˜utkj
βastij
+ a˜utkjβ
)η
Bstij =
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
a˜utkj
βastij
φγsistij
τstijωsi
ϕsi
a˜utkj
βastij
+ a˜utkjβ
Rearranging generates equation (A.28):
(1−AstijBstijη) γsiφ̂stij = − (1−AstijBstijη) (τ̂stij − âstij) +
Astij (1− η) ω̂tj
ϕtj
+Astijη
α̂Vtj
αZtj
γsiφ̂stij = âstij − τ̂stij + Astij (1− η)(1−AstijBstijη)
ω̂tj
ϕtj
+ Astijη(1−AstijBstijη)
α̂Vtj
αZtj
A.4.13 Deriving Equation (A.33)
Substituting equation (A.4) into the FOC for φstij , equation (A.31), gives:
τstijκsiνsiφ
κsi−1
stij
ϕsi
PσZtj
pσZstij
Ztj − λξ Xtj
φstij
= 0
Substituting equation (A.32) leads to:
τstijκsiνsiφ
κsi−1
stij
ϕsi
PσZtj(
τstijνsiφ
κsi
stij
ϕsi
)σZtj − λξ Xtjφstij = 0
Rearranging and defining a similar equation for φutkj leads to:
κsiνsiφ
κsi(1−σ)
stij
(
τstij
ϕsi
)1−σ
PσZtjZtj − λξXtj = 0
κukνukφ
κuk(1−σ)
utkj
(
τutkj
ϕuk
)1−σ
PσZtjZtj − λξXtj = 0
Combining the two equations:
κsiνsiφ
κsi(1−σ)
stij
(
τstij
ϕsi
)1−σ
= κukνukφκuk(1−σ)utkj
(
τutkj
ϕuk
)1−σ
φ
γsi(1−σ)
stij =
κukνuk
κsiνsi
(
τutkj
τstij
ϕsi
ϕuk
)1−σ
φ
γuk(1−σ)
utkj
φstij =
(
κukνuk
κsiνsi
) 1
κsi(1−σ)
(
τutkj
τstij
ϕsi
ϕuk
) 1
κsi
φ
κuk
κsi
utkj
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A.4.14 Deriving Equation (A.35)
First rewrite equation (A.31) as follows using equations (A.4) and (A.11):
τstijκsiνsiφ
κsi−1
stij
ϕsi
zstij − λξ Xtj
φstij
= 0
τstijκsiνsiφ
κsi−1
stij
ϕsi
PσZtj
pσZtsij
Ztj − λξ Xtj
φstij
= 0
τstijκsiνsiφ
κsi−1
stij
ϕsi
PσZtj
pσZtsij
αηztjP
−η
Ztj
 Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
(η−1) P ηXtjXtj
−PXtjξ
Xtj
φstij
= 0
Substitute the expression for
PσZtj
pσ
Ztsij
from equation (A.13) and rearrange:
τstijκsiνsiφ
κsi
stij
ϕsi
(
I
1
1−σ
tj ˜κνstij)σ αηZtjP−ηZtj
 Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
(η−1) P ηXtj
−PXtjξ = 0
τstijκsiνsiφ
κsi
stij
ϕsi
(
I
1
1−σ
tj ˜κνstij)σ αηZtjP−ηZtj
−
 Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
(1−η) P 1−ηXtj ξ = 0
A.4.15 Deriving Equation (A.36)
Substituting equation (A.10) and rearranging equation (A.35) gives:
τstijκsiνsiφ
κsi
stij
ϕsi
(
I
1
1−σ
tj κ˜νstij
)σ
αηZtjP
−η
Ztj
−
(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
)(1−η)
×
1(
Itj∏
i=1
φξstij
)(1−η) (αηztjP 1−ηZtj + αηvtjω1−ηtj ϕη−1tj ) ξ = 0
τstijκsiνsiφ
κsi
stij
ϕsi
(
I
1
1−σ
tj κ˜νstij
)σ
αηZtjP
−η
Ztj
−
(
αηztjP
1−η
Ztj
+ αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj
)
ξ = 0
τstijκsiνsiφ
κsi
stij
ϕsi
(
I
1
1−σ
tj κ˜νstij
)σ
−(
αηztjP
1−η
Ztj
+ αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj
)
α−ηZtjP
η
Ztj
ξ = 0
τstijκsiνsiφ
κsi
stij
ϕsi
(
I
1
1−σ
tj κ˜νstij
)σ
−
(
PZtj + α
η
vtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj α
−η
Ztj
P ηZtj
)
ξ = 0
Substituting equation (A.32) and (A.34) leads to equation (A.31):
τstijκsiνsiφ
κsi
stij
ϕsi
(
I
1
1−σ
tj ˜κνstij)σ =
pzstijI
1
1−σ
tj ˜κνstijξ + αηvtjω1−ηtj ϕη−1tj α−ηZtj (pzstij ˜κνstij)η ξ
τstijκsiνsiφ
κsi
stij
ϕsi
(
I
1
1−σ
tj ˜κνstij)σ = τstijνsiφκsistijϕsi I 11−σtj ˜κνstijξ
+αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj α
−η
Ztj
(
τstijνsiφ
κsi
stij
ϕsi
I
1
1−σ
tj ˜κνstij)η ξ
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A.4.16 Deriving Equation (A.37)
Start from equation (A.15) and solve for φstij :
τstijνsiφ
κsi
stij
ϕsi
I
1
1−σ
tj ˜κνstij
(
κsi
ξ
(
I
1
1−σ
tj ˜κνstij)σ−1 − 1
)
=
αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj α
−η
Ztj
(
τstijνsiφ
κsi
stij
ϕsi
I
1
1−σ
tj γ˜stij
)η
(
τstijνsiφ
κsi
stij
ϕsi
I
1
1−σ
tj ˜κνstij)1−η
(
κsi
ξ
(
I
1
1−σ
tj ˜κνstij)σ−1 − 1
)
=
αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj α
−η
Ztj
τstijνsiφ
κsi
stij
ϕsi
I
1
1−σ
tj ˜κνstij =
1(
κsi
ξ
(
I
1
1−σ
tj ˜κνstij)σ−1 − 1
) 1
1−η
(
αηvtjω
1−η
tj ϕ
η−1
tj α
−η
Ztj
) 1
1−η
φκsistij =
ϕsi
τstijνsi
1
I
1
1−σ
tj
γ˜stij(
κsi
ξ
(
I
1
1−σ
tj ˜κνstij)σ−1 − 1
) 1
1−η
(
αvtj
αZtj
) η
1−η
(
ωtj
ϕtj
)
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A.5 Data Appendix and Additional Regression Tables
Table A.1: Results using a trimmed instead of winsorized sample
(1) (2) (3)
ln pzsti ln pzsti ln pzsti˜θsti∗u 0.800 1.780 0.857
(9.10)*** (6.44)*** (1.78)*
LnGDPt -3.457 -2.130
(8.23)*** (3.26)***
LnGDPpercapitat 3.278 2.109
(8.72)*** (3.69)***
Lndistancest 0.175
(25.49)***
LnGDPpercapitas 0.179
(13.90)***
LM test for underid 463.15 160.09 37.23
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-stat for weak id 552.11 146.57 42.17
R2 0.78 0.78 0.52
First stage: ˜θsti∗u ˜θsti∗u ˜θsti∗u
IV 0.122 0.055 0.037
(23.50)*** (12.11)*** (6.49)***
LnGDPt 1.267 1.281
(23.04)*** (23.83)***
LnGDPpercapitat -1.156 -1.145
(19.96)*** (20.39)***
Lndistancest -0.003
(1.43)
LnGDPpercapitas -0.004
(0.99)
R2 0.94 0.95 0.78
N 5,849,899 5,849,899 6,052,284
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Table A.2: First stage results, intermediate goods
(1) (2) (3) (4)˜θsti∗u ˜θsti∗u ˜θsti∗u ˜θsti∗u
IV 0.121 0.053 0.053 0.036
(23.58)*** (11.61)*** (11.61)*** (6.45)***
LnGDPt 1.293 1.293 1.293
(24.02)*** (24.02)*** (24.35)***
LnGDPpercapitat -1.179 -1.178 -1.156
(20.78)*** (20.78)*** (20.85)***
Lndistancest -0.004
(1.56)
LnGDPpercapitas -0.004
(0.85)
HI 0.003 0.004
(6.90)*** (2.77)***
R2 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.78
N 6,584,575 6,584,575 6,584,575 6,755,827
Table A.3: First stage results, final and homogenous goods
Final goods sample Homogenous goods sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)˜θsti∗u ˜θsti∗u ˜θsti∗u ˜θsti∗u ˜θsti∗u ˜θsti∗u
IV 0.058 0.015 0.054 0.050 0.023 0.041
(14.04)*** (3.28)*** (11.20)*** (9.67)*** (3.62)*** (8.72)***
LnGDPt 0.667 0.643 0.798 0.829
(10.37)*** (9.86)*** (9.23)*** (9.35)***
LnGDPpercapitat -0.587 -0.604 -0.736 -0.785
(8.87)*** (9.00)*** (8.54)*** (8.58)***
Lndistancest 0.004 0.003
(1.64) (0.92)
LnGDPpercapitas 0.001 0.013
(0.17) (1.82)*
R2 0.93 0.94 0.69 0.94 0.94 0.71
N 1,977,513 1,977,513 2,018,782 567,499 567,499 603,775
Table A.4: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln pzsti 6,755,827 2.122299 1.578961 -0.4879416 5.44458˜θsti∗u 6,755,827 0.1655888 0.1688882 -0.6576125 1.163728
LnGDPt 6,755,827 20.45467 1.474147 16.81022 23.35959
LnGDPpercapitat 6,755,827 3.314647 0.4747392 1.513526 4.082383
Lndistancest 6,755,827 7.747976 1.159812 4.087945 9.828204
LnGDPpercapitas 6,755,827 2.55059 1.152499 -0.786483 4.082383
IV 6,755,827 9.443422 0.3529929 8.489432 11.63757
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Table A.5: Importer countries in the sample (only intermediate goods)
Importers Observations Share (in %)
Australia AUS 256,515 3.8
Austria AUT 393,527 5.83
Czech Republic CZE 348,202 5.15
Germany DEU 636,375 9.42
Denmark DNK 333,045 4.93
Spain ESP 446,670 6.61
Finland FIN 308,439 4.57
France FRA 529,177 7.83
United Kingdom GBR 536,828 7.95
Hungary HUN 290,622 4.3
Ireland IRL 223,013 3.3
Italy ITA 563,504 8.34
Japan JPN 333,050 4.93
Netherlands NLD 475,261 7.03
Slovenia SVN 182,275 2.7
Sweden SWE 380,749 5.64
United States USA 518,575 7.68
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Table A.6: Exporter countries in the sample (only intermediate goods)
Exporters Observations Share (in %)
Australia AUS 151,612 2.24
Austria AUT 221,326 3.28
Bulgaria BGR 132,068 1.95
Brazil BRA 155,722 2.31
Canada CAN 181,086 2.68
China CHN 252,185 3.73
Cyprus CYP 79,670 1.18
Czech Republic CZE 196,986 2.92
Germany DEU 307,450 4.55
Denmark DNK 194,270 2.88
Spain ESP 230,955 3.42
Estonia EST 115,163 1.7
Finland FIN 176,392 2.61
France FRA 270,965 4.01
United Kingdom GBR 277,403 4.11
Greece GRC 138,547 2.05
Hungary HUN 177,098 2.62
Indonesia IDN 152,210 2.25
India IND 203,138 3.01
Ireland IRL 152,182 2.25
Italy ITA 275,052 4.07
Japan JPN 199,631 2.95
Korea, Rep. KOR 185,095 2.74
Lithuania LTU 120,348 1.78
Latvia LVA 102,327 1.51
Mexico MEX 156,150 2.31
Netherlands NLD 251,879 3.73
Poland POL 209,490 3.1
Portugal PRT 168,412 2.49
Romania ROM 167,489 2.48
Russian Federation RUS 184,032 2.72
Slovak Republic SVK 160,004 2.37
Slovenia SVN 143,553 2.12
Sweden SWE 210,437 3.11
Turkey TUR 193,723 2.87
United States USA 261,777 3.87
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Table A.7: Observations belonging to different HS2 categories
only products identified as non-homogenous intermediate goods)
hs2 Freq. Percent hs2 Freq. Percent
1 9,316 0.07 48 374,043 2.91
2 39,296 0.31 49 80,695 0.63
3 132,305 1.03 50 14,243 0.11
4 26,101 0.2 51 40,862 0.32
5 31,055 0.24 52 241,296 1.87
6 33,704 0.26 53 35,880 0.28
7 97,856 0.76 54 206,092 1.6
8 92,314 0.72 55 274,671 2.13
9 929 0.01 56 92,576 0.72
11 52,497 0.41 57 71,599 0.56
12 68,263 0.53 58 125,716 0.98
13 28,302 0.22 59 81,263 0.63
14 11,951 0.09 60 64,681 0.5
15 55,423 0.43 61 435,501 3.38
16 68,617 0.53 62 531,619 4.13
17 27,100 0.21 63 196,382 1.53
18 31,094 0.24 64 121,056 0.94
19 58,293 0.45 65 35,980 0.28
20 106,551 0.83 68 162,412 1.26
21 59,731 0.46 69 109,150 0.85
22 72,942 0.57 70 212,220 1.65
23 15,120 0.12 71 1,181 0.01
24 14,352 0.11 72 417,336 3.24
25 18,751 0.15 73 477,024 3.71
27 52,797 0.41 74 136,515 1.06
28 268,377 2.09 75 25,689 0.2
29 630,877 4.9 76 123,835 0.96
30 110,351 0.86 78 10,124 0.08
31 37,710 0.29 79 14,484 0.11
32 173,352 1.35 80 3,384 0.03
33 128,217 1 81 29,773 0.23
34 95,658 0.74 82 285,896 2.22
35 52,212 0.41 83 169,405 1.32
36 11,256 0.09 84 1,880,106 14.61
37 84,760 0.66 85 1,134,277 8.81
38 179,073 1.39 86 38,515 0.3
39 506,551 3.94 87 303,515 2.36
40 232,791 1.81 88 34,106 0.26
41 51,920 0.4 89 32,425 0.25
42 93,523 0.73 90 18,733 0.15
43 24,934 0.19 91 1,505 0.01
44 176,497 1.37 93 41,353 0.32
45 15,136 0.12 94 62,401 0.48
46 15,685 0.12 96 3,222 0.03
47 14,768 0.11 97 9,635 0.07
Total 12,870,684 100
The final sample used for the regressions is somewhat smaller due to
data restrictions on some of the explanatory variables.
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